However, the word evolution implies a comparatively leisurely process in which, by trial and error, organisms develop more efficient ways of responding to a changing environment. A year later, the metaphor seems less apt. I992 saw an almost five-fold increase in United Nations peacekeeping activity; we had some II,OOO military and police personnel deployed at the beginning of the year; by its end the total was over 52,000. Today 'the forced development of peacekeeping' might be a better title.
I propose first to analyse what peacekeeping had become by the time the Cold War ended; then to classify the different types (I would have referred to 'species' if the evolution metaphor was still appropriate) of peacekeeping operations which are currently deployed or being planned; then to discuss the current trend from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement and the implications it has for the United Nations ability to develop into an effective system of collective security; and finally to draw some brief conclusions about the heavy * Cyril Foster was a retired confectioner who, in I956, left his estate to Oxford University with the request that it be used to enable 'a prominent and sincere speaker' to deliver once a year a lecture on the elimination of war and the better understanding of the nations of the world. The key role played by UNTSO in the difficult task of implementing the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements of I949 and UNEF's success in defusing the Suez crisis led to further demands for the Organization's peacekeeping services.
The golden age dare I say the first golden age?-of United Nations peacekeeping was from I956 to I974, though there was a hiatus for six years after the disaster that befell UNEF in I967. Those I8 years gave birth to I0 of the I3 peacekeeping operations established before the revival of demand for peacekeeping in the late I980s. On the whole they succeeded well in helping to control regional conflicts, especially in the Near East, at a time when the Cold War made it difficult for the Security Council to take effective action to resolve them.
The Congo operation (I960-64) deserves special mention. It is often described as a failure, but in fact it succeeded in its objectives, albeit at a very UNIFIL has not been able to carry out its mandate because it has never enjoyed the necessary cooperation from all the parties concerned. But its presence has brought succour to the people of southern Lebanon and its withdrawal would certainly lead to an intensification of hostilities. It has thus become a quasi-permanent fixture. It illustrates how much easier it is to get into -a peacekeeping operation than to get out of it-and the need therefore for the Security Council to satisfy itself that conditions exist for successful peacekeeping before taking the decision to set up a new operation.
The I 3 operations established during the Cold War (of which five remain in existence) fostered the gradual evolution of a body of principles, procedures and practices for peacekeeping. Few of them were formally enacted by the legislative organs of the United Nations. But they came to constitute a corpus of case law or customary practice which was by and large accepted by all concerned, though until the mid-ig8os Moscow continued from time to t to grumble about peacekeeping's lack of legitimacy because it was not explicitly provided for in the Charter. rather than of the collective will of the international community, could be fatal for the credibility of an operation. It had been learnt the hard way that it could also-literally-be fatal for the peacekeepers themselves.
Second, it had become established over time that peacekeeping operations could be set up only with the consent of the parties to the conflict in question. It had also been learnt that they could succeed only with the continuing consent and cooperation of those parties. This had turned out to be both a strength and a weakness.
It was a strength in that, for the parties, it made peacekeeping less threatening and more acceptable. For the troop-contributing countries, it reduced to a very low level the risk of combat casualties. It was supposed also, in theory, to improve the chances of success; the parties would have agreed in advance to what the peacekeepers were going to do.
In practice, the consent principle had sometimes turned out to be more of a weakness than a strength. Consent once given could later be withdrawn.
President Nasser's withdrawal of Egypt's consent to the presence of UNEF I on Egyptian territory in May I967 had been the classic example. It tragically illustrated the perennial truth that if one of the parties takes the decision to go to war there is very little that peacekeepers can do to prevent war. In other cases, cooperation promised was later reduced or withheld. This could be especially difficult for the peacekeepers when they found that they, not those who had broken their promises, were blamed for the resulting human suffering and/or humiliation of the United Nations.
Third, it had been established that the peacekeepers must be impartial between the parties. They were not there to advance the interests of one party against those of the other. It was not like Korea where the United States and its allies had been authorized by the Security Council to use force against North
Korea for the benefit of South Korea. This principle of impartiality arose from the fact that peacekeeping operations were interim arrangements set up, as UNEF had been, without prejudice to the claims and positions of the parties.
Of course, the peacekeepers had to criticize, use pressure, mobilize international support, even in certain circumstances take more forceful action when a party violated agreed arrangements. But, beyond that, they could not take sides. The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping operation had been accepted by the parties. This requirement for absolute impartiality sometimes obliged peacekeepers to maintain normal relations with a party whose behaviour was being censured by most of the international community and thus exposed them to the charge of condoning that behaviour.
The fourth principle related to the troops required for United Nations peacekeeping operations. It was recognized that it would not be practicable for the United Nations to maintain a standing army. National armies and police forces could be the only source for the uniformed personnel the United Nations required. The Charter provided for member states to enter into binding agreements with the Security Council under which they would commit themselves to provide it with troops. There had been no agreement between the major powers on the conclusion of such agreements for peacekeeping operations-or indeed for peace enforcement. Successive Secretaries-General had perforce, therefore, to rely on member states to provide the necessary personnel and equipment on a voluntary basis. Member states had responded readily to the call.
The fifth principle concerned the use offorce. More than half the organization's peacekeeping operations before I988 had consisted only of unarmed military observers. But when operations were armed, it had become an established principle that they should use force only to the minimum extent necessary and that normally fire should be opened only in self-defence.
However, since I973 self-defence had been deemed to include situations in which peacekeepers were being prevented by armed persons from fulfilling their mandate. This was a wide definition of 'self-defence'. In practice commanders in the field had only very rarely taken advantage of the authority to open fire on, for instance, soldiers at a roadblock who were denying passage to a United Nations convoy. This reluctance was based on sound calculations related to impartiality, to their reliance on the continued cooperation of the parties and to the fact that their force's level of armament was based on the assumption that the parties would comply with their commitments. The peacekeepers could perhaps win the firefight at that first roadblock. But, in lands of the vendetta, might they not find themselves out-gunned in the third or fourth encounter?
On the basis of these principles established during the first four decades of
United Nations peacekeeping, a definition of peacekeeping could perhaps read as follows:
Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.
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